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CORPORATE SPEECH &
THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
Thomas W. Joo*
I. INTRODUCTION
How might the role of money in electoral politics change if
corporations had no First Amendment rights? In short, “not
much.” Insofar as the Supreme Court has protected business
1
corporations under the Constitution, that protection has never
expressly relied on the notion that a corporation per se has
constitutional rights. To the contrary, a central strategy of the
Court’s corporate constitutional jurisprudence has been to avoid
deciding whether corporations are the holders of constitutional
rights. Critics of corporate constitutional jurisprudence must
recognize that it is based not on the rights of the corporation but
on the rights of others. Recognizing this fact reveals the real
weakness of the Court’s reasoning: it depends on a
mischaracterization of corporate governance as a participatory
democracy.
This Essay makes two main arguments. First, the
jurisprudence extending constitutional protection to corporations
focuses not on the rights of corporations themselves, but on the
rights of others. Criticizing the Court for focusing on corporate
constitutional “personhood” misses the point of the case law. In
fact, the jurisprudence has avoided simplistically equating the
corporate legal “person” with the human individual to whom the
* Professor, UC Davis School of Law. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the “Advancing a New Jurisprudence for American Self-Government and
Democracy” symposium in November 2014. The author would like to thank Free Speech
for People and Harvard Law School for sponsoring the symposium, Ron Fein and John
Coates for organizing it, and Jill Hasday and Tamara Piety for helpful discussion and
comments on this paper.
1. This Essay focuses on for-profit business corporations. The constitutional case
law, however, tends to conflate business and nonprofit corporations. Citizens United v.
FEC, for example, involved a nonprofit corporation, but the opinion refers simply to
“corporations.” The opinion is clearly intended to apply to business corporations, since it
discusses the interests of shareholders, which nonprofits do not have. See 558 U.S. 310, 362
(2010).
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Constitution guarantees rights. The Court has done so by
carefully reframing corporate constitutional law issues to focus on
the interests of individuals. The Court has done this in two ways:
First, it sometimes treats a corporation as an “aggregate” of
individual natural persons. Second, in the free speech context, it
focuses on the rights of human listeners rather than those of
corporate speakers. For example, the Court has justified
corporate speech protection on the basis of individuals' interest in
hearing diverse viewpoints.
My second point focuses on the real weakness of the
corporate constitutional jurisprudence: its reliance on the
common misconception that the actions of a corporation reliably
reflect the will of its constituent individuals. Using this flawed
assumption, the Supreme Court has held that corporate
regulations infringe on the due process and Fourth Amendment
rights of natural persons. The Court has made a related error in
the free speech context—the central concern of this Essay.
Although listeners may have an interest in hearing corporate
messages, that may conflict with the interests of the corporation’s
shareholders (or its other constituents, such as employees) if they
disagree with those messages. But the Court has dismissed this
concern on the ground that shareholders control a corporation’s
2
messages through “the procedures of corporate democracy.”
However, corporate law does not, and is not intended to, run
corporations in a democratic way. Rather, in the interests of
money-making efficiency, the law concentrates power in
3
professional managers. They enjoy nearly unreviewable
discretion to control the resources of the corporation with
negligible input from shareholders. As intended, this arrangement
is likely to benefit shareholders financially. But it does not protect
them (or other corporate constituents) from corporate political
spending or other speech acts they disagree with. This fact
undermines the Court’s listeners’ rights argument against
corporate campaign finance regulation. It is also consistent with
the proposed “Democracy for All Amendment,” which would

2. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.765, 794 (1978); Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 362.
3. See Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance, 79 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 78 (2001) (“[C]orporate governance can be centralized and efficient, or it can
be participatory and expressive, but it cannot be both.”).
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expressly permit campaign finance law to regulate corporations
4
and natural persons differently.
Another proposed constitutional amendment, the “People’s
Rights Amendment,” would amend the Constitution to exclude
corporations from the categories of “people, person, or citizen as
5
used in this Constitution.” The amendment aims to deny
corporations the rights the Constitution gives to human
individuals. Because corporate First Amendment law does not
depend on corporate rights per se, however, the People’s Rights
Amendment would have no immediate determinative effect on
corporate campaign finance regulation or other corporate speech
laws. (It could nonetheless be useful in informing the Court of the
public’s impatience with corporate constitutional protection,
whatever its doctrinal basis.)
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part II
describes the two ways in which the Supreme Court bases its
corporate constitutional law jurisprudence on the rights of others:
the aggregate theory and the listeners’ rights doctrine. Part III
explains how these theories depend on the misperception that
corporate decisions are made through “procedures of corporate
democracy.” The Court does not indulge in a nonsensical
equation of corporations with human beings. The real failing of
the jurisprudence is its mischaracterization of corporate law and
governance. Corporate constitutional doctrine is thus based on a
fundamental misunderstanding about how corporations work.
II. THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
Constitutional doctrine avoids the question of whether
corporations are constitutional “persons” and focuses instead on
the rights of others in two ways. First, the Court sometimes treats
a corporation as no more, and no less, than an “aggregate” of
6
human individuals. The Court then focuses on the rights of those
individuals. In the First Amendment free speech context, the
4. See S.J. Res. 19 & H.J. Res. 119, 113th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2014). The proposed
amendment would authorize “reasonable limits on the raising and spending of money by
candidates and others to influence elections” and permit Congress and the states to
“distinguish between natural persons and corporations or other artificial entities created
by law, including by prohibiting such entities from spending money to influence elections.”
5. See S.J. Res. 18 & H.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). Free Speech for
People, a co-sponsor of this Symposium, supports both amendments. See FREE SPEECH
FOR PEOPLE, www.freespeechforpeople.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). I should disclose
that I am a member of Free Speech for People’s Legal Advisory Committee.
6. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 213–14
(1990).
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Court allows corporations to invoke individuals’ rights in a second
way. The so-called “listeners’ rights” theory of the First
Amendment protects the public’s right to hear messages, and thus
requires neither a corporate nor an individual “right” to speak.
The troublesome “corporate” aspects of the cases are thus
made to disappear, and the Court employs existing notions of
natural persons’ constitutional rights. While avoiding the fallacy
of anthropomorphizing the corporation, this reductionist
approach has fallacies of its own, because it depends on
misunderstandings about the law and practice of corporate
governance. Corporate governance is designed to optimize
business performance by concentrating power in the hands of
professional management. This is inconsistent with the aggregate
theory’s notion that a corporation’s acts reflect the consensus of
its members. It is also in tension with the listeners’ rights theory.
Even if listeners have an interest in hearing political messages, it
may be inappropriate for management to unilaterally decide to
pay for such messages with corporate funds.
It may be argued that it is excessively formalistic to
distinguish between constitutional protection based on corporate
7
“personhood” and protection derived from rights of others.
Whatever lawyerly rhetoric is deployed, corporations are in effect
protected like individuals. While there is truth to this description
of the end result, it is dangerous to be dismissive of the Court’s
method of reaching that result. Advocating for reform requires an
understanding of what is really at stake, but also the ability to
challenge legal arguments on their own terms. These specific
formal and rhetorical strategies are particularly well-suited to our
neo-formalist and (nominally) libertarian era. The Court has
carefully chosen to evade the (still-unanswered) question of
corporate speech “rights” and reframe the issue in terms that are
consistent with both existing constitutional law doctrine and
various politically powerful notions: property rights, free markets,
freedom of information, and limited government.
7. See, e.g., Jeff Clements, We never said corporations are people, CORPORATIONS
ARE NOT PEOPLE, Jan. 12, 2012, http://corporationsarenotpeople.com/2012/01/23/wenever-said-corporations-are-people-we-said-they-are-voices-speakers-speech-makers-aclass-of-persons-thats-different/ (“No matter how the Court couches it, First Amendment
rights or any other rights that are demanded and received by a corporate entity results in
recognition – implicit, if nothing else – of a corporate Constitutional person.”); Melissa
Block, What is the Basis for Corporate Personhood?, Nat’l Public Radio, Oct. 24, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141663195/what-is-the-basis-for-corporate-personhood
(“[T]he Occupy Wall Street protesters have distorted the details, but they really have it
right in spirit.”).
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A. CORPORATION AS AGGREGATE
In some contexts, the Court has treated corporations’
constitutional claims as vindicating the rights of its constituent
individuals. The Court first expressed this view in late nineteenthcentury cases invalidating state regulations for infringing on
property rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process clause. In Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling
Co. v. Pennsylvania, an 1888 case, the Court stated that “the
designation of person” in the Fourteenth Amendment includes
corporations because they are “merely associations of individuals
8
united for a special purpose.” The Court did not hold that a
corporation is itself a “person” in some metaphysical sense.
Rather, the Court held that corporation is a group of individuals,
and thus that its legal treatment affects the constitutional rights of
9
individual persons. In a 1906 case, Hale v. Henkel, the Court
invoked the aggregate theory to justify protecting a corporation’s
papers from unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees this right
to “the people,” the Court did not state that corporations
themselves are “people,” but again focused on the individuals
behind the corporation: “A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity.”
More recently, in Hobby Lobby, the Court applied the
aggregate theory to non-constitutional free exercise rights. Hobby
Lobby and its co-petitioners were corporations that objected to
the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that employers provide

8. 125 U.S. 181, 188 (U.S. 1888). There is a persistent myth that the Court granted
corporations constitutional “personhood” two years earlier, in Santa Clara County. v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See, e.g., Dustin Volz, The Surprising
and Complicated History of the ‘Corporations Are People’ Doctrine, NAT’L JOURNAL, July
1, 2014, http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/the-surprising-and-complicatedhistory-of-the-corporations-are-people-doctrine-20140701; Thomas Storck, Corporate
Personhood and 14th Amendment Rights, CRISIS MAGAZINE, May 30, 2012,
http://www.crisismagazine.com/2012/corporate-personhood-and-14th-amendment-rights.
At oral argument in Santa Clara, Chief Justice Waite announced that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to corporations. He did not state why,
however, and did not state that corporations are “persons.” In any event, although this
unusual statement appears in the headnotes of the case, see id. at 394, it was not part of the
opinion, which was decided on state-law grounds and did not even address the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, the lower court opinion, prefiguring Pembina, applied the
Fourteenth Amendment using the aggregate theory. See Charles R. O’Kelley, The
Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited, 67 GEO. L. J. 1347, 1353–56 (1979).
9. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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contraception coverage for their employees. 10 Each corporation
was entirely owned and controlled by the members of a single
family whose members unanimously opposed the mandate on
11
religious grounds. The case was based not on the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, but on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). According to RFRA, the
government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion” unless the burden furthers a compelling governmental
12
interest by the least restrictive means available. The word
“person” in a federal statute includes corporations “unless the
13
context indicates otherwise.” In language reminiscent of
Pembina and Hale, the Court insisted that protecting the
petitioner corporations was necessary in order to protect
individuals:
Congress provided protection for people . . . by employing a
familiar legal fiction: It included corporations within RFRA’s
definition of “persons.” But it is important to keep in mind that
the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human
beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used by
human beings to achieve desired ends . . . . [P]rotecting the freeexercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby . . . protects
the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those
companies.

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause has not (yet)
been applied to business corporations, but Hobby Lobby’s
reasoning would seem to apply. The Clause forbids Congress from
“prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Hobby Lobby’s
aggregate reasoning suggests that, at least in a small, privately
14
owned corporation, corporate regulations can interfere with the
religious exercise of its owner-managers.

10. The corporations specifically objected to the requirement that they cover
contraceptives that act after conception. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct.
2751, 2764 (2014).
11. Id. at 2764–65 (describing Conestoga Wood Specialties, owned by the Hahn
family); see also id. at 2765–66 (describing Hobby Lobby and Mardel, owned by the Green
family).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b) (emphasis added).
13. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
14. The Court limited its decision to “closely held” business corporations like the
petitioners (that is, corporations owned by a small number of shareholders), and expressly
declined to decide whether it would apply to a publicly traded corporation with large
numbers of shareholders. 134 S.Ct. at 2774.
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B. CORPORATIONS AND LISTENERS’ RIGHTS
In corporate free speech cases under the First Amendment,
the Court has invoked the rights of others in a different way. The
aggregate theory suggests that corporate speech acts (including
the political spending at issue in Citizens United) might be
characterized as the protected speech of the corporation’s
constituent individuals. The Court has not taken this approach,
however. Instead, it has invoked the so-called “listeners’ rights”
doctrine, under which a government regulation violates the Free
Speech Clause if it interferes with the public’s interest in receiving
15
messages. The Court originally developed that doctrine outside
the corporate context to protect unpopular speech without having
16
to defend the rights of unpopular speakers such as communists,
17
18
pornographers, and prison inmates. When the issue of
corporate speech came before the Court, focusing on listeners’
rights allowed the Court to invalidate regulations on First
Amendment grounds while once again avoiding the issue of
“corporate rights.” Although the listeners’ rights theory focuses
primarily on the audience and not the speaker, the Court’s
application of the doctrine to corporate speech depends on an
understanding of the corporation similar to that found in the
aggregate theory, as will be explained below.
The Court relied on listeners’ rights doctrine when it first
protected corporate political spending in First National Bank of
19
Boston v. Bellotti and invoked the same argument in Citizens
United. In Bellotti, a Massachusetts state statute prohibited
business corporations from spending money to influence a voter
referendum unless it “materially affect[ed] the property, business,
20
or assets of the corporation.” A group of corporations
challenged the statute. In striking it down, the Court specifically
stated that “we need not . . . address the abstract question whether
corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy
21
under the First Amendment.” Instead, the Court used the
15. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 576
(1980) (“[A] strict standard of review applies . . . where the purpose of the restraint is to
influence behavior by depriving citizens of information.”). Although commentators and
lower courts refer to this doctrine as “listeners’ rights,” the Court itself does not.
16. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
17. See Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
18. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1974) (overruled in part on other
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–14 (1989)).
19. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
20. Id. at 774.
21. Id. at 777.
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listeners’ rights doctrine: “the First Amendment goes beyond
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
22
which members of the public may draw.”
Although the decision focused on the interests of listeners,
the analysis depended in part on the notion that a corporation’s
shareholders control its speech, and was in this respect
reminiscent of the aggregate theory. Even assuming that listeners
have a right to hear the political messages of corporations, the
state of Massachusetts argued that it had a countervailing interest
in “preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of
23
views with which some shareholders may disagree.” The Court
rejected this justification on the ground that “shareholders
normally are presumed competent to protect their own
24
interests.” The Court went so far as to declaim, “Ultimately
shareholders may decide, through the procedures of corporate
democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on
25
public issues.” The Court did not expressly state that corporate
speech constitutes shareholder expression. Rather it seemed to
make the related, but slightly more modest, claim that
management decisions to fund political speech do not constitute
unauthorized use of shareholder property. In any event, as with
the aggregate theory, the listeners’ rights justification for
protecting corporate speech assumes that shareholders control
the corporation.
In Citizens United, the Court again relied on listeners’ rights.
It also cited Bellotti’s aggregate-based notion that shareholders
control corporate speech. As in Bellotti, the Court did not directly
address a corporation’s right to expression and focused instead on
individuals’ interest in receiving information: “voters must be free
to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine
26
how to cast their votes.” Like Massachusetts in Bellotti, the
federal government in Citizens argued that the corporate
regulations in question served the government’s compelling
interest in “protecting dissenting shareholders from being
27
compelled to fund corporate political speech.” The Court,
quoting Bellotti, dismissed this argument on the ground that there
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 783.
Id. at 792–93.
Id.
Id.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
Id. at 362.
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was “little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
shareholders
‘through the
procedures
of
corporate
28
democracy.’”
Although the opinions sometimes use the terminology of
29
rights, “listeners’ rights” decisions often turn on the public policy
concern of information availability and not on individual “rights”
in the technical sense. As Bellotti and Citizens United
demonstrate, the plaintiff can be the speaker, and need not be an
actual listener who can prove she has been harmed. Indeed, the
doctrine does not require any such person to be identified at all:
the listener and her harm can be mere hypothetical constructs. It
has been argued that because listeners’ rights doctrine is based on
instrumental policy interests rather than categorical individual
rights, listeners’ rights arguments have less power than challenges
30
based on expressive rights. As the state argued in Bellotti, the
domination of political speech by corporate money may “drown
31
out other points of view.” Both the speech and the regulation
potentially serve the same interest: providing voters with a
diversity of political views. Thus it has been argued that such
regulations should be subject to “intermediate” or even “rational
basis” review, and not to the strict scrutiny normally applied to
32
speech regulation. The Court clearly rejected this distinction in
Bellotti, however: the Court applied strict scrutiny based on
information availability alone, having expressly stated that it was
33
irrelevant whether the corporate plaintiff had expressive rights.
The danger of corporate voices “drowning out” others was
insufficiently compelling to survive this scrutiny. Applying the
same level of scrutiny in both the expressive and the listeners’
rights contexts is consistent with the wording of the Free Speech
Clause (“Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech”), which mentions neither “persons” nor expressive rights.
A few years after Bellotti, the Court seemed to reverse course
and treat corporate speech differently from that of individuals. In
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Court held
that a state’s corporate campaign finance regulation was
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“[T]he Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas.”).
30. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected
Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229,
1247 (1991).
31. 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978)
32. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 30.
33. 435 U.S. at 786.
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justifiably aimed at counteracting the “distorting effects of
34
immense aggregations of wealth.” The Court appeared to accept
the “drowning out” argument it had rejected in Bellotti, although
it did not purport to overrule Bellotti. Two decades later,
however, Citizens United expressly overruled this aspect of Austin
35
and reaffirmed Bellotti.
While it is convenient to describe the Free Speech Clause in
terms of the rights or interests of speakers or listeners, it is
arguably not based on individual interests at all. Many
commentators argue that it should be seen as “negative rather
36
than affirmative,” that is, as a restriction on government power
37
rather than a conferral of individual rights. The Clause is of
course phrased in just that way: as a prohibition on speech
38
regulation by Congress. The Court implied the “negative”
theory in Citizens United: “Premised on mistrust of governmental
power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor
39
certain subjects or viewpoints.” Soon afterwards, the Court
offered further support for the “negative” theory of free speech.
In 2012, United States v. Alvarez subjected a speech regulation to
strict scrutiny even though the Court identified neither an
expressive nor a listeners’ right. The Court struck down the Stolen
Valor Act, a federal statute that imposed a criminal penalty on
anyone falsely claiming to have received a U.S. military
40
decoration. The Court did not assert that the petitioner
prosecuted under the statute had a right to tell his “intended,
41
undoubted lie,” nor that listeners have an interest in hearing
such lies.
Bellotti and Citizens United were premised on the notion that
protecting political messages protects the voting public. But
Alvarez went further, giving constitutional protection to false
factual assertions that provide no public benefit. Indeed, the
speech was concededly harmful, such that government had an
interest in protecting the public from it. But that interest was
insufficiently compelling, the Court found, because the public can
34. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
35. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
36. See Kathleen Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV.
143, 156–57 (2010).
37. See id.; see also ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS 3 (2010).
38. Concurring in Citizens United, Justice Scalia noted that the Free Speech Clause
is “written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers.” 558 U.S. at 392.
39. Id. at 340.
40. United States v Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012).
41. Id. at 2542.
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supposedly protect itself from such harm without the
government’s help. The law was unconstitutional not because it
violated anyone’s rights, but simply because the Court found it
unnecessary (despite the government’s assertion to the contrary).
The Court quoted Justice Holmes’ famous dictum: “the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
42
competition of the market,” and offered its own, more explicitly
antigovernment version: “Only a weak society needs government
protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to preserve
43
the truth.”
Cases like Bellotti make clear that either expressive or
listeners’ rights can be sufficient to invalidate speech regulation.
But Alvarez suggests that neither speakers’ nor listeners’ rights
are necessary for this purpose: consistent with the “negative”
theory, the Court simply applied an extremely strong
presumption against any governmental regulation of
communication. In any case, under either listeners’ rights or a
negative theory, corporations’ free speech arguments are
independent of constitutional “personhood” or speech “rights.”
Thus excluding corporations from the category of “person,” as the
People’s Rights Amendment proposes, would have no apparent
44
effect on corporate free speech doctrine.
The listeners’ rights doctrine has allowed the Court to protect
corporate political activity and other speech while avoiding the
thorny question of whether corporations have the same
expressive rights as individuals. The negative theory further
supports these results and suggests the Court might go even
further, invalidating almost all regulations on corporate
communication and political spending on the ground that the
“marketplace of ideas” is self-regulating. In challenging the
constitutional protection of corporate political spending, it seems
unrealistic to expect reform of fundamental First Amendment
notions such as listeners’ rights and the negative theory. The
jurisprudence can be challenged on narrower grounds, however,
by focusing on its erroneous view of corporate law.

42. Id. at 2550 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
43. Id. at 2550–51.
44. Furthermore, the aggregate theory notwithstanding, the People’s Rights
Amendment might be used to deny Due Process protection to corporations, which could
have drastic consequences for property rights.
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III. THE MYTH OF “CORPORATE DEMOCRACY”

A. THE CENTRALIZATION OF CORPORATE AUTHORITY
In both Bellotti and Citizens United, the government warned
of a danger that management may use corporate resources to fund
speech that conflicts with shareholders’ views. Thus, the
government may have a compelling interest in regulating
45
corporate speech in order to protect shareholder property. The
Court rejected this argument on the ground that shareholders
protect themselves from such harm through “the procedures of
46
corporate democracy.” Like the aggregate theory, this argument
is based on the idea that the acts of a corporation reflect the
shared will of its constituent individuals. This notion is mistaken,
however. Corporate governance is not, and is not intended to be,
a participatory democracy that reflects the ideas and values of a
corporation’s constituents. Rather, it purposefully restricts the
governance roles of shareholders and other constituents in favor
of professional managers who are charged with making money for
the corporation. Thus, Bellotti and Citizens United were wrong to
casually assume that shareholders run the corporation. In fact,
corporate governance has no mechanisms to insure that corporate
speech that serves the rights of others (that is, listeners) does not
infringe upon the rights of still others—namely shareholders or
other corporate constituents who may disagree when
management uses corporate resources for political purposes.
Shareholders do not participate directly in decisionmaking, nor
do shareholders have significant input into the selection of
managers. Their primary recourse when they disagree with
47
management is simply to sell their shares and move on.
In his Citizens United dissent, Justice Stevens specifically
questioned the Court’s faith in “corporate democracy”:
I fail to understand why the Court is so confident in these
mechanisms . . . . In practice . . . many corporate lawyers will
tell you that [shareholders’ rights to vote and to sue directors
for breach of fiduciary duty] are so limited as to be almost
nonexistent, given the internal authority wielded by boards and

45. This Essay takes no normative stance with respect to the listeners’ rights doctrine.
As a descriptive matter, however, it is a fundamental aspect of free speech jurisprudence.
As a strategic matter of legal reform, I see less potential in questioning that theory than in
pointing out demonstrable errors in the Court’s reading of corporate law and governance.
46. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978); Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010).
47. See Joo, supra note 3, at 44–45, 57–58.
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managers and the expansive protections afforded by the
48
business judgment rule.

Justice Stevens correctly characterized corporate governance
as management-centered rather than shareholder-directed. The
“internal authority wielded by boards and managers” is a
fundamental characteristic of corporate governance. Corporate
law, by design, does not empower shareholders. Rather, it
49
consciously grants control to professional management.
Delaware’s corporate code, for example, states that: “The
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
50
directors.” This means not only that the law gives directors dayto-day control, but that it specifically denies control to
51
shareholders. Directors’ control of corporate governance is not
a usurpation of shareholders’ legal rights. Rather, it is the explicit
design of corporate law, in which collective ownership creates
governance problems. Some corporations, like Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., are owned by small, harmonious groups of
shareholders who run the corporation because they also serve as
the directors and officers. Most large corporations, however, have
huge numbers of shareholders who cannot operate by consensus
and do not (and may not want to) serve as directors or officers.
Centralized control by professional managers thus arose as “a
highly efficient solution to the decisionmaking problems faced by
52
larger corporations.” Efficiency and democracy, however, are
two very different principles.
Unfortunately, it is not surprising that the Court gets
corporate law so wrong. The Court has little interest in business
53
law per se. In the constitutional context, it makes inaccurate,
48. 558 U.S. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
49. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“A cardinal precept
of the [Delaware Code] is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business
and affairs of the corporation.”)
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a); cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).
51. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 573–74 (2002)
(“Shareholders exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or longterm policy”). In practice, boards delegate much of their management power to executive
officers they appoint, such as the CEO.
52. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence
Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 59 (2002).
53. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private
Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1573
(2004) (arguing that the Court suffered from a “loss of interest” in securities regulation
and antitrust law following the 1987 retirement of Justice Lewis Powell, a former corporate
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unsupported generalizations about corporate law that seem more
54
normative than descriptive. Since most of the non-corporate
legal community (like the Court) has only limited interest in and
understanding of corporate law, the superficiality of its corporategovernance analysis tends to go unnoticed. Indeed, even though
his Citizens United dissent criticized the Court’s flawed
assumptions about corporate governance, Justice Stevens seemed
to be similarly uninterested in the details of corporate law. He did
not refute the “corporate democracy” assertion in detail, and
devoted only two of the eighty-six pages of his dissent to the issue.
In Bellotti, the Court cited three specific examples of
“procedures of corporate democracy”: “the judicial remedy of a
derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to
have been made for improper corporate purposes,” shareholders’
ability “to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation’s
charter,” and shareholders’ “power to elect the board of
55
directors.” The Court did not describe these mechanisms in any
detail. In Citizens United, the Court simply repeated Bellotti’s
general assertion about “procedures of corporate democracy”
(and even asserted that they had been enhanced by advances in
56
information technology ) without elaboration. In fact, the three
governance devices cited in Bellotti are far more limited than the
Court casually assumed. In general, corporate governance is not
intended to be a democracy, but rather a management-centered
57
technocracy. The remainder of this Part shows that these three
devices are not examples of democratic governance. This Part
goes into considerable doctrinal detail to correct the gross,
inaccurate generalizations that have distorted the First
Amendment analysis of corporate campaign finance law.
lawyer); cf. A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 845 (2003) (explaining that Justice “Powell felt
a special responsibility to guide his colleagues when they faced securities law questions”
due to their relative lack of experience with securities law).
54. Cf. Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation: Jurisprudence, Localism,
and Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1997). Despite lip service to the notion that
corporate law was reserved to the states, Mark argues that the Court had, by the early
nineteenth century, “casually adopted a single, universal understanding of what
constituted a corporation, rather than allowing the states to define the entity.” Id. at 422.
Indeed, Mark argues that it was the Court, and not the states, that “define[d] the role of
the corporation in the political economy and the role of managers within the corporation.”
Id. at 435 (summarizing the case law).
55. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
56. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
57. See, e.g., Joo, supra note 3, at 39–79; see also Thomas W. Joo, A Trip through the
Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 744–63 (2003).
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B. LIMITS ON SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION:
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The “business judgment rule” (“BJR”), a judicially created
state law doctrine, reflects how corporate governance
concentrates authority in the board of directors. Bellotti asserted
that shareholders may use litigation to “challenge corporate
disbursements alleged to have been made for improper corporate
purposes or merely to further the personal interests of
management,” but ignored the BJR’s limits on this ability. Justice
Stevens referred to the BJR only in passing in his Citizens United
dissent, but it is of central importance in circumscribing the role
of shareholders and enlarging the discretion of directors. The BJR
insulates directors from shareholder lawsuits challenging the
substance of their decisions, and political spending decisions
appear to be included.
Corporate directors have few enumerated legal duties. While
it is often asserted that directors have a “duty” to enrich
shareholders or to act in their best interests, this is simply not true.
In fact, it is legally irrelevant whether a decision of the board
58
actually benefited shareholders. The relevant inquiry pertains to
the process and motivation behind the decision, not its result. This
inquiry is a highly deferential one: the BJR operates on the
“presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the
company . . . . Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will
be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging
59
the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.”
Case law demonstrates that rebutting the presumption is
extremely difficult, and that the category of “business decision”
to which it applies is very broadly defined. For example, in Kahn
v. Sullivan, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the BJR when
60
shareholders challenged a corporation’s charitable contribution.
The Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s board had approved an
$85 million corporate donation to establish the Armand Hammer
Museum and Cultural Center, which had been proposed by and
58. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 181 (1968) (“[W]e do not mean
to say that we have decided that the decision of the directors was a correct one. That is
beyond our jurisdiction and ability. We are merely saying that the decision is one properly
before directors and the motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud,
illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision”).
59. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
60. 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
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named after Occidental’s chairman and CEO in order to display
his personal art collection. Although the decision obviously
benefited Hammer, and the other directors had obvious reasons
to cater to him, the court deferred to the board’s decision because
the shareholders had failed to overcome the BJR’s presumptions.
The court noted that the directors responsible had no personal
financial interest in the outcome and were not “dominated” by
61
Hammer. In keeping with the BJR’s focus on procedure and not
substance, the court made no inquiry into whether the
contribution actually generated any benefit to the corporation or
its shareholders. Note that the court applied the business
judgment rule to this decision of the board even though it had no
readily apparent connection to the corporation’s petroleum
business.
62
A California case, Marsili v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,
applied the BJR to corporate political expenditures in similar
fashion. A municipal ballot measure in San Francisco proposed a
voter approval requirement on the construction of tall buildings.
Shareholders challenged a utility company’s contributions to a
group opposing the measure, which had no obvious connection to
the company’s business. The court stated that the board was not
required to show that the expenditures would benefit the
63
corporation. Indeed, the court held that it was required to defer
to the board’s decision unless it found, “as a matter of law, that the
contribution could not be construed as incidental or expedient for
64
the attainment of corporate purposes.”
Under the BJR, shareholders would have great difficulty
suing directors for expending corporate funds for political
purposes. Merely disagreeing with the expenditure on political
grounds would state no claim. The BJR would impose an
extremely strong presumption that the expenditure was proper.
Arguing that the expenditure had no clear benefit to the
corporation or showing that it served the directors’ personal
interests would not upset that presumption. Shareholders would
face a very high burden of proving the directors’ bad faith or
complete failure to inform themselves.

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 59–60.
51 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1975).
Id. at 324–35.
Id. at 324.
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C. LIMITS ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING POWER
1. Policy and Charter Amendments
The Bellotti Court also inaccurately stated that shareholders
control corporate actions through voting and the corporate
charter. Similarly, Justice Scalia has asserted that management
must act “in accord with what the majority (or a specified
supermajority) of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action
65
is designed to make a profit. That is the deal.” But shareholder
approval of management decisions is not the deal. As noted
above, the corporation “shall” be managed by its board of
directors. Thus the vast majority of the board’s actions are not
subject to a shareholder vote. (Furthermore, as explained in the
foregoing discussion, the BJR requires no proof that a board
decision was “designed to make a profit.”)
State corporation codes give shareholders explicit approval
power over only a tiny subset of management actions classified
66
(somewhat arbitrarily) as “fundamental changes.” These are
typically limited to amendments to the corporate charter, a
merger with another corporation, the dissolution of the
corporation, and the sale of all (or substantially all) of the
67
A corporation undergoes these
corporation’s assets.
“fundamental” changes infrequently, if ever. Among these
changes, only charter amendments are potentially relevant to
political spending. According to the Bellotti Court, shareholders
can “insist upon protective provisions in the corporation’s
charter.” But while a charter amendment could conceivably limit
the board’s power over a corporation’s political spending,
shareholders in most states may only approve (or disapprove)
amendments proposed by the board of directors; they may not
68
initiate charter amendments on their own. The assertions of
Bellotti notwithstanding, shareholders in most corporations can
only request that directors initiate a charter amendment; they
have no legal power to “insist” on one.

65. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Austin upheld a corporate campaign finance regulation using reasoning
inconsistent with Bellotti; Justice Scalia made this argument in dissent. Twenty years later,
Citizens United expressly overruled Austin and reaffirmed Bellotti.
66. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.3(a), at 195 (2d ed. 2010).
67. See id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 242(b) (charter amendment), 251(c)
(merger), 271 (sale of assets), 275(b) (dissolution).
68. See GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.1.3(a), at 196; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
242(b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(a).
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In large corporations, elections take place at an annual
shareholder meeting, but the vast majority of shareholders, who
are spread out around the country or even the world, do not
attend. Thus the corporation (and occasionally, some other party)
solicits shareholders’ proxies: that is, it asks them for permission
to cast their votes in a certain way. The board, at the corporation’s
expense, produces and distributes to shareholders a set of “proxy
materials” that include a description of the issues to be voted on,
as well as the corporation’s proxy solicitation. Federal securities
law regulates the proxy process. A shareholder may make a
proposal for shareholders to vote on, but the law expressly
permits the corporation (that is, its board of directors) to exclude
certain shareholder proposals from the corporation’s proxy
69
materials. If the corporation properly excludes a proposal from
the corporation’s proxy materials, the proponent must pay for the
separate production and dissemination of her own proxy
materials. This can be difficult and costly, as the materials must
conform to federal securities regulations. Lacking the official
imprimatur of the corporation, independent proxy materials risk
being perceived as junk mail by shareholders who receive them.
Federal law provides a number of grounds on which a
corporation may exclude a shareholder proposal from the proxy
materials. For example, a proposal that is not “a proper subject
70
for action by shareholders” may be excluded. According to the
SEC, some shareholder proposals, “depending on the subject
matter,” would violate state law if they were binding on the
71
corporation. This is apparently a reference to the rule that
72
directors and not shareholders manage the corporation. To
avoid exclusion on this ground, shareholder proposals are
73
typically worded in nonbinding form.
2. Director Elections
Shareholders have the power to vote for directors, but this
power is of limited consequence in the vast majority of elections.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., 8 Del. Code § 141(a), discussed supra. In fact, the extent to which state
law prohibits binding shareholder proposals is less than clear. See also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 511–14 (4th ed. 2006). But the SEC’s guidance is
influential, since it will decide in the first instance whether a corporation may exclude a
particular proposal, and its decision will be subject to the standard judicial deference
accorded to agency determinations. See id. at 513–14.
73. See GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.2.3(a) at 270.
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In fact, “shareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic
74
sense elect boards. Rather, boards elect themselves.” Director
elections are rarely contested; incumbent directors or their
75
nominees typically run unopposed. Voting for directors thus
gives shareholders no significant influence on boards’ political
spending.
Because default state law rules allow directors to be elected
by a plurality of votes cast, unopposed directors can be elected
76
even if they receive more negative than positive votes. Many
companies have voluntarily instituted rules under which directors
must submit their resignations if they do not receive a majority of
positive votes in an uncontested election. (These policies are
sometimes referred to as “plurality plus” or “Pfizer-style”
77
policies.) But even in such situations, the board may reject the
78
resignations and allow the directors to continue to serve.
Federal securities law deliberately impedes corporate
democracy in a fundamental way: proxy regulations actively
discourage shareholders from contesting the election of
79
directors. Indeed, even when an election is contested, the
corporation is not required to list the challengers’ names in the
corporation’s proxy materials. The challengers must fund their
80
own separate proxy solicitation. Although state law does not
prohibit shareholders from nominating directors, federal
securities law expressly permits the corporation to exclude a
81
shareholder’s proposal to nominate a specific director candidate.
In fact, federal law also permits the exclusion of any shareholder
74. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 311 (1999).
75. See GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.1.2(a), at 187.
76. See The Election of Corporate Directors: What Happens When Shareowners
Withhold a Majority of Votes from Director Nominees? GMI RATINGS (Aug. 2012) at 6,
http://www3.gmiratings.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/GMIRatings_IRRC_082012.
pdf.
77. See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d
281, 284 n.4 (Del. 2009) (en banc). Pfizer, Inc. was one of the first major corporations to
adopt such a rule. Id.
78. See GMI RATINGS, supra note 76. This occurred in City of Westland, discussed
infra note 86.
79. In fact, prior to a rule change in 2010, the SEC specifically stated on numerous
occasions that proposals to reform director election procedures could be excluded on the
ground that they “would establish a procedure that may result in contested elections of
directors.” See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”:
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 762, & nn.
125–26. Although the current rule (described in the text) has been narrowed somewhat,
the rule still significantly limits the contestation of elections.
80. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra 72, at 408.
81. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(iv).
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proposal that “otherwise could affect the outcome of the
upcoming election of directors,” such as an objection to one of the
board’s nominees or an immediate change to election
82
procedures. Corporate law thus facilitates the board’s control of
elections, allowing it nearly exclusive use of corporate resources
in corporate election campaigns.
3. Informed Voting: Law vs. Technology
In Citizens United, the Court opined that “corporate
democracy” has become more effective since Bellotti because
83
technology has made shareholders more informed. This shows
remarkable naïveté about the interaction between technology and
law. While public-domain information is more easily accessible in
the internet era, much corporate information is proprietary and
protected from shareholder inquiries. Shareholders have no
general right to inform themselves about management conduct
through corporate records. The corporation must grant a
shareholder’s request to view corporate records only if the
shareholder can demonstrate that the request has a “proper
84
purpose.” Although this requirement sounds innocuous, “it can
85
produce fairly extensive court proceedings.” Under Delaware
case law, for example, seeking evidence of wrongdoing or
mismanagement is a “proper purpose.” However, a shareholder
may not inspect corporate records for that purpose unless she first
presents independently obtained evidence forming a “credible
86
basis” for suspicion. Shareholders thus have very limited ability
to monitor corporate political activity using the corporation’s own
information.

82. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(v). This includes, but is not limited to, proposals that
would disqualify a nominee, remove a sitting director, or question “the competence,
business judgment, or character” of a nominee or director. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a8(i)(8)(i)–(iii). In 2010, the SEC adopted a so-called “proxy access” rule that would have
required the corporation to include a director nomination made by a large shareholder or
bloc (representing at least three percent of a corporation’s voting power) under certain
circumstances. But the D.C. Circuit struck down the rule in 2011, finding that the SEC had
been “arbitrary and capricious” in adopting it. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
83. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010)..
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2010); City of Westland Police & Fire Ret.
Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d 281, 287 (Del. 2010). Cf. MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 16.02(d)(1).
85. GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.1.3(c), at 217.
86. See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d
281, 287 (Del. 2009) (en banc).
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A 2010 Delaware Supreme Court opinion demonstrates the
strictness of the rule. The court rejected a shareholder request to
view records regarding two major governance issues: a potential
sale of the company and a board election. In 2008, the board of
Axcelis Technologies, Inc. rejected another company’s offers to
87
buy out Axcelis’s shareholders at $5.20 and later $6 per share.
(These were generous offers: the market price of the shares was
88
$4.18 at the time of the first offer. ) A few months later, three
directors ran for re-election unopposed, but failed to receive a
majority vote. Because Axcelis had a “Pfizer-style” policy, they
tendered their resignations. The board, however, refused to
accept the resignations. About a year later, after further
acquisition negotiations failed, Axcelis defaulted on a debt
89
obligation and its stock price fell to 41 cents.
The City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System (an
Axcelis shareholder) asked to see Axcelis’s records regarding the
board’s refusal to accept the director resignations and its rejection
of the acquisition offers. The court rejected both requests on the
ground that the plaintiffs had not presented any evidence of
wrongdoing by the board. The requested records themselves were
of course the most likely source of such evidence. In short,
shareholders have no general right to inform themselves via
corporate records, which further limits their already limited
voting power.
D. “SHAREHOLDER VOTING” IS INHERENTLY UNDEMOCRATIC
Of course, an individual’s voting power is also limited in our
political system. But that merely suggests the shortcomings of our
nominally democratic politics; it does not attest to the democratic
character of corporate governance. Indeed, corporate voting
power is based on economic and not democratic principles: it is
not equal among individuals, but weighted on the basis of
financial interest.
The term “shareholder voting” is somewhat misleading, as
90
votes are allocated not per shareholder but per share —that is, on
87. Id. at 283.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 285.
90. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.21(a). This
has not always been the case. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the
Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1347, 1354–55 (2006) (explaining that each shareholder had one vote in many
nineteenth-century corporations).
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the basis of wealth. The rare shareholders that can successfully
influence corporate management are individuals and institutions
that control huge numbers of votes—i.e., those wealthy enough to
own huge numbers of shares. Furthermore, not all shares receive
an equal vote, or any vote at all. While a corporation must have a
class of voting stock, not every class must have voting rights, and
91
not every voting class must have equal voting rights. Some
corporations have classes of shares with super-voting power that
are expressly designed to concentrate voting power in a
controlling shareholder or group. Facebook, for example,
allocates about four percent of its total shareholder votes to its
publicly held shares and the remainder to a separate class of stock
92
that is not for sale to the public. This capital structure gives the
majority of Facebook’s shareholder voting power to its CEO,
93
Mark Zuckerberg.
Moreover, voting power is allocated only to shareholders, as
are the other (limited) governance rights discussed in this Essay:
fiduciary duty suits, the approval of charter amendments, and
access to corporate records. The Court has insisted over and over
that corporate constitutional “rights” actually protect the rights of
the individuals behind the corporation. It has, however, been
vague as to just who those individuals are. In Pembina, for
instance, the Court stated only that corporations are “associations
of individuals united for a special purpose.” In an 1883 circuit
court opinion that strongly influenced the Court’s aggregate
94
theory, Justice Field argued that Fourteenth Amendment
95
protection of corporate property protects “the corporators also.”
It is unclear to whom Field was referring. The archaic term
91. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 212(a); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.21(a) (stating
that the default allocation of one vote per share may be altered by the corporation’s
charter).
92. At the time of its initial public offering of Class A common stock in 2012,
Facebook explained that stock would receive one vote per share, while its Class B stock,
which is not sold to the public, would receive ten. It further explained: “The holders of our
outstanding shares of Class B common stock will hold approximately 95.9% of the voting
power of our outstanding capital stock following this offering, and our founder, Chairman,
and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, will hold or have the ability to control approximately 55.8%
of the voting power of our outstanding capital stock following this offering.” Facebook,
Inc., Amendment No. 8, to Registration Statement Under Securities Act of 1933, (Form
S-1) (May 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/00011
9312512235588/d287954ds1a.htm.
93. See id.
94. See Charles R. O’Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited, 67
GEO. L. J. 1347, 1353–56 (1979).
95. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 404 (C.C.D. 1883). Justice Field
wrote this opinion for the Circuit in his capacity as Circuit Justice.
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“corporator” was sometimes used to refer to the managers who
exercise the corporate powers, as distinct from the shareholders,
96
who do not. Today, shareholders are often assumed to be the
primary corporate constituents, as indicated by the discussion
(however brief and dismissive) of shareholder interests in Bellotti
and Citizens. The Hobby Lobby Court, however, stated that
corporate constitutional protection protects a broader set of
97
people, “including shareholders, officers and employees.”
In fact, corporate constitutional claims are even less
representative of employee interests than shareholder interests.
Employees and other non-shareholder corporate constituents
(such as creditors) have no voting power and are owed no
fiduciary duties. But corporate policies, such as wages and
benefits, layoffs, and taking on additional debt often have a more
98
immediate and dramatic effect on them than on shareholders.
Executives and large creditors can use economic leverage to
protect their interests (and executives control policymaking in any
event). Rank-and-file employees and smaller creditors and
clients, however, lack economic leverage (with the exception of
some unionized employees). Shareholder advocates have had
some success advancing reforms (such as the Pfizer rule) intended
to increase management responsiveness to shareholders. This is
an admirable goal, but it does nothing for corporations’ other
constituents, whose economic and political interests differ from
those of shareholders. Such reforms may increase shareholders’
control over their investments, but they should not be mistaken
for “democratic” reform.
The Supreme Court either fails to understand corporate
governance or deliberately misrepresents it, misleadingly
describing it as “democratic.” The Court invokes “corporate
democracy” as part of its “listeners’ rights” argument, which is
based on the unrestricted flow of information, even though
corporate law expressly limits shareholder access to information.
The Court insists that “corporate democracy” justifies the role of
corporations in financing our political elections, despite the anti-

96. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the
Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646 (1982).
97. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). The Court nonetheless ignored the dissent’s
argument that legal exemptions for corporations based on the religious views of their
owners might burden the religious exercise of their employees. See id. at 2795–96
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. See Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the “D-Word,” 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1579, 1587–88 (2006).
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competitive and wealth-based aspects of conducting and financing
corporate elections.
Corporate law assigns voting power according to the size and
nature of one’s economic interest in the corporation. Such an
allocation may be justifiable on economic grounds. Indeed, it is
generally beneficial to shareholders in their capacity as financial
investors, and most shareholders seem to be satisfied with it. But
it does not constitute corporate “democracy,” and cannot justify
the role of corporations in our electoral system. A democratic
allocation of voting power is not dependent on economic
interests. Suffrage may not be conditioned on wealth, property
99
ownership or the ability to pay a fee, nor on one’s economic
100
role. In a democracy, each voter’s vote is counted once, and only
101
once. Shareholders and other corporate constituents might
arguably be seen as having agreed to the wealth-based allocation
of voting power as a condition of their investment or other
relationship to the corporation. But even if voluntary and
bargained for, vote selling is, like wealth-based qualifications,
inconsistent with a democratic process, and is prohibited in the
102
The more the law allows corporate
political context.
participation in the electoral process, the more corporate
governance becomes an element of political governance. While
the non-democratic nature of corporate governance may serve
valid economic goals, it justifies limiting the role of business
corporations in our politics.
IV. CONCLUSION
A constitutional amendment denying constitutional
“personhood” to corporations would not have a determinative
effect on corporate campaign finance doctrine. But it could help
communicate public attitudes and thus have some effect on the
99. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (outlawing poll taxes); Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that “a state violates the Equal Protection
Clause . . . of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard”).
100. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (holding that “there is no indication
in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for
distinguishing between qualified voters within the State”).
101. See id. at 380–81 (“The only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution
concerns matters of representation, such as the allocation of Senators . . . irrespective of
population and the use of the electoral college in the choice of a President . . . [O]nce the
class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by
which equality of voting power may be evaded.”).
102. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1996) (prohibiting paying any person “to vote or
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate”).
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Court’s future decisions. The “Democracy for All Amendment”
is more directly responsive to the current jurisprudence, in that it
expressly permits distinctions between individual and corporate
campaign finance regulation. As this Essay has argued, however,
simply correcting the Court’s assumptions about corporate
governance law could reform the case law without a constitutional
amendment. Because “corporate democracy” does not protect
shareholders (and other corporate constituents) from
management’s misuse of corporate resources for political
purposes, the Court could recognize a compelling governmental
interest in providing such protection.
This would require neither a constitutional amendment, nor
even any fundamental changes to First Amendment doctrine. It
could be accomplished through the relatively modest step of
reversing (explicitly or implicitly) Bellotti and that part of Citizens
United that echoed Bellotti. Indeed, the Court has arguably
provided an opening for the arguments presented here. When it
cited Bellotti in Citizens, the Court stated, “There is . . . little
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’” The analysis
here suggests that shareholders might lead the way in challenging
the legal regime permitting corporate political spending by
pointing out how corporate governance in fact gives them no
mechanism to “correct” abuses. Hobby Lobby can also be viewed
as consistent with an appreciation of shareholders’ limited control
of large corporations. The Court held that corporate policy
implicated the religious exercise of individuals, but limited its
holding to closely held corporations. Unlike large, publicly traded
corporations, the plaintiff corporations were owned and run by
families with unanimous religious views and not by professional
managers independent of the shareholders.
Doctrine always changes, sometimes rapidly, as Court
personnel or political and economic conditions change. Corporate
constitutional rights have been no exception. The Court initially
refused to extend the Fourteenth Amendment to economic and
corporate rights in the Reconstruction era. In the next decades,
however, it completely reversed itself, ushering in the Lochner
era. Lochnerism eventually gave way during the New Deal. Yet
the contemporary First Amendment protection of corporate and
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commercial messages has been called the revival of Lochnerism.103
The pendulum will eventually swing again. Whether courts
reverse doctrine or apply existing doctrine to reach different
results, public attitudes and political pressure can surely make a
difference. The recent dramatic changes in same-sex marriage law
attest to this.
In fact, although current campaign finance jurisprudence is
strongly pro-corporate, that is a recent development. By relying
on listeners’ rights, Bellotti seemed to prohibit treating corporate
political contributions differently from those of individuals. But
the Court seemed to reverse itself in Austin twelve years later,
citing the “unfair advantage” enjoyed by corporations. After
another twenty years, Citizens United overruled Austin and
reaffirmed Bellotti. Such dramatic reversals could occur again.
The tension between skepticism of speech regulation and
revulsion at the influence of money is likely a constant that fuels
an ongoing cycle of doctrinal revision.

103. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First
Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659, 661 (1999).

